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exercising state police powers in this manner. The
state has a substantial interest in preserving socie-
tal order and morality. Consequently, Indiana's
statute satisfied the first two prongs of the O'Brien
test.
Notably, Justice Souter's concurrence emphasized
a substantial governmental interest in preventing
the secondary effects of adult entertainment estab-
lishments. Indiana contended that nude dancing
"encourages prostitution, increases sexual as-
saults, and attracts other criminal activity."" Ac-
cordingly, Justice Souter asserted that these secon-
dary effects of nude barroom dancing created an
important governmental interest worthy of state
enforcement through public indecency statutes.
The third prong of the O'Brien test requires that
the government interest be unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression. Respondents claimed
that the state's prohibition of nude dancing was
related to expression because it "[sought] to prevent
its erotic message.' 2 However, the Supreme Court
rebutted respondents' contention that Indiana
sought to silence the erotic message of nude danc-
ing. The Court rejected any "expansive notion of
'expressive conduct"' which would allow "an appar-
ently limitless variety of conduct to be labeled
'speech' whenever the person engaging in the con-
duct intends thereby to express an idea.' 3 The
state's purpose was to prevent public nudity re-
gardless of whether it involved expressive activity.
The Supreme Court further determined that by
allowing performances in which dancers wore pas-
ties and G-strings, Indiana did not proscribe the
communication of an erotic message. The statutory
requirement of a "fully opaque covering" merely
"made the [erotic] message slightly less graphic"
without depriving the dancer of his or her right of
expression. 4
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed the fourth
prong of the O'Brien test which requires that "the
incidental restriction on first amendment freedom
be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
the governmental interest." 5 The Indiana statute
provided that a person who appears knowingly and
intentionally in a state of nudity in a public place
commits public indecency, and that 'nudity' is the
showing of human genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or
the nipple of a female breast with less than a fully
opaque covering. 6 The Supreme Court contended
that to require pasties and G-strings was 'modest,
and the bare minimum necessary to achieve the
state's purpose."' 7 Accordingly, the government
regulation only incidentally restricted first amend-
ment freedom and was narrowly tailored to serve
the state's interest. Therefore, Indiana's public in-
decency statute satisfied the fourth and final prong
of the O'Brien test and was held constitutionally
valid by the United States Supreme Court.
Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit perceived the Indiana legisla-
tion as a total ban on expressive conduct based on
its expressive content. While it recognized the
state's authority to establish reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions (regulations unre-
lated to the suppression of speech), the Seventh
Circuit found that the statute at issue did not limit
itself by these constitutional guidelines. Conse-
quently, the Seventh Circuit found the Indiana
statute violative of the third and fourth prongs of
the O'Brien test and unconstitutional as applied. 18
However, the Supreme Court denied the content-
based and total ban arguments of the Seventh
Circuit and ultimately justified its ruling by assert-
ing that the Indiana restriction on nude dancing
was incidental to the expressive nature of this
recognized first amendment conduct. 92
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Art Buchwald v.
Paramount Pictures Corp.
13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1497 (Cal. Super. 1990).
Introduction
Plaintiff, Art Buchwald, brought an action against
Paramount Pictures Corporation for breach of con-
tract in the development of an idea for a motion
picture.' Buchwald claims that after his negotia-
tions with Paramount ended, Paramount released
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a film similar to his idea, without recognition or
payment, in breach of their agreement. To recieve
punitive damages, Buchwald also asserted tort
claims based on bad faith, tortious breach of con-
tract, and fraudulent concealment against Para-
mount.2 The court concluded that the works were
similar enough in content and in the parties in-
volved. The court found a breach of contract by
Paramount and decided for Art Buchwald on the
contract claim.3 However, the court decided for
Paramount on the tort claims.
4
Facts
In early 1982, Art Buchwald prepared a screen
treatment entitled "It's a Crude, Crude World" and
registered it with the Writers Guild of America.
Late in 1982, the story was pitched to Paramount
Pictures for development into a movie starring Ed-
die Murphy. In January 1983, Paramount regis-
tered the title "King For A Day," the new title, and
sought a writer for the story. Buchwald and Para-
mount entered into an agreement on March 22,
1983 for the movie as a possible project for Eddie
Murphy.
A few months later the first draft of "King For A
Day" was completed and described in a memoran-
dum as the "Art Buchwald idea" that Paramount
was "now developing for Murphy." Paramount also
attempted to employ John Landis as director of the
film. After exercising several options with Buch-
wald, Paramount confirmed that "King For A Day"
had been abandoned early in 1985 because Para-
mount could not procure a writer for the script.
Therefore, Buchwald optioned his treatment for
"King For A Day" to Warner Brothers in May 1986.
In the summer of 1987, Paramount began develop-
ing a story called "The Quest," based on a story by
Eddie Murphy, to be directed by John Landis. The
shooting script for "Coming To America," the sub-
sequent title, was dated October 21, 1987. In the
meantime, Warner Brothers was still developing
Buchwald's treatment.
In January 1988, Warner Brothers canceled "King
For A Day" partly because of the discovery that
Paramount was shooting "Coming To America"
starring Eddie Murphy. When "Coming To Amer-
ica" was released, the story credit was given to
Eddie Murphy.
Legal Analysis
The court determined that this was a case based
primarily on breach of contract which must be
analyzed in reference to the agreement and the
rules of contract construction. 5 Pursuant to the
agreement, Buchwald transferred to Paramount all
motion picture and other rights to his original story
and concept. The first issue was the meaning of the
term "based upon," because the agreement pro-
vided that Buchwald was entitled to payment only
if Paramount produced a "feature length theatrical
motion picture based upon Author's Work. '6 There
was little agreement among the experts as to the
meaning of the term "based upon" in the entertain-
ment industry. The court therefore looked to the
appellate decisions of the state for guidance. It
found that an inference of copying may arise when
there is proof of access to the material with a
showing of similarity and that, where there is
strong evidence of access, less proof of similarity
may suffice.
7
The court decided that there was no question Eddie
Murphy had access to Buchwald's concept. In addi-
tion, the evidence established that Murphy knew of
the concept.8 Paramount's creative executives had
met at least four times with Murphy and his man-
ager to discuss Buchwald's idea and Murphy had a
positive reaction to the concept.
The court then considered the question of similar-
ity; a factual inquiry for the trier of fact to deter-
mine.9 The court rejected Paramount's contention
that the similarity must be substantial and stated
that if there is a contractual obligation to pay for
an idea, the defendant cannot avoid such liability
because he only copied the abstract or the basic
idea. 10 Rather, the court determined that Para-
mount's obligation arose to pay Buchwald if "Com-
ing To America" was based upon a material element
of or was inspired by Buchwald's treatment." The
court compared the two works and concluded that
the similarities between the two stories were suffi-
cient to impose contract liability on Paramount.
Additionally, the plaintiff asserted tort claims to
recover punitive damages. However, the court
found no tortious conduct. Paramounifs conduct
was not in bad faith, fraudulent, oppressive, or
malicious. Therefore, the plaintiffs were denied
recovery on their tort claims. 2 The court concluded
that, bearing in mind the unlimited access in this
case and the rule that the stronger the access the
less striking and numerous the similarities need
be, Paramount had appropriated and used a quali-
tatively important part of Buchwald's treatment in
such a way that the works were substantially simi-
lar.1 3
Conclusion
The court concluded that Paramount breached its
contract with Art Buchwald by producing a film
based upon Buchwald's idea, in violation of the
express language of the contract. The court held
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